

'OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DIRECTOR. TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

1 3 MAR 10

19 MAR 2075

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Postulated Effect of SALT II Failure on C<sup>3</sup>(S) - INFORMATION **MEMORANDUM** 

(%) Last summer, DTACCS participated in a review of the implications to DoD of a failure to achieve a meaningful SALT II agreement with the USSR. Such a failure would mean that the number of warheads available to the enemy for employment against our  $C^3$  facilities as well as our strategic missiles could be greatly increased. As a consequence, we would need greater survivability for our  $C^3$  facilities. We would also have to consider shifting from a strategy of pre-planned weapons employment to one of active battle management as well.

(S) In the first area, priority should be given to providing survivable, enduring communications. to the FBM submarines. Their relative strategic value would increase in direct proportion to the decrease in Minuteman survivability. An example would be a strong financial commitment to survivable ELF communications.

In the second area, I would envision enhancing the capability of the Advanced Airborne National Command Post (AABNCP) to conduct flexible battle management. This would include adding on-board automatic data processing coupled with ground-based small processing stations to provide' sensor data. Hardened command centers possessing more endurance than aircraft would be considered as well.

(U) Obviously, other  ${\bf C}^{\bf 3}$  capabilities would also be assessed but these would be the principal near term actions having the greatest payoff. The range of added costs according to our system architect is from

Richard H. Shriver

Prepared by Mr. Paul E. McGraw, Jr., ext. 52844

x0 8580 FOR

Classified by DTACCS SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCH EXECUTIVE ORDER 11650. AUTOMATICALLY DOWNERS AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS. LECLASSIFIED ON 31Deco